



Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Lessons about Property From Law and Economics

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Overview

- Stylized Operational Observations
- Basic Theorems in Economics
- “Carbon Capture and Sequestration is Like...”
- Application to Carbon Capture and Sequestration



About Economists

- Fundamental bias toward private allocation of resources
- Bias is consistent with recent trends in environmental policy



Definition of Economist

One who observes a phenomenon in the real world and thinks,
“That is interesting, but will it work in theory?”




Stylized Operational Observations

- What happens to the CO₂?
 - It fills pores spaces at depths of 800 to 3000 meters, often in saline aquifers, generally underlying private property
- What does the plume of a 5 MMT/yr injection look like?
 - CO₂ rises vertically and migrates laterally within reservoir, eventually covering as much as 1000 square miles.

Stylized Operational Observations

- How many land holdings will overlay a typical plume?
 - Potentially thousands
- Can we predict where the CO₂ will migrate?
 - In heterogeneous reservoirs there will be significant uncertainty regarding the ultimate path and mode in which the CO₂ will exist in the reservoir





Stylized Operational Observations

- How will those land holdings be affected?
 - In addition to subsurface flows, the CCS operation will require surface access to test the mechanical integrity of abandoned oil and gas wells and possibly to install monitoring instruments and wells



Moving from Operations to Policy

- So CCS involves deep injection into a largely unused reservoir, the plume of which could spread over large areas, affecting potentially thousands of landowners, following an uncertain path, with potential impacts on both the surface and subsurface.
- So how do we deal with property rights? Can we let private parties sort it out? Will they find an efficient outcome?



First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

The prices that arise from a competitive economy with self-interested traders will lead to an efficient allocation of resources.



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Competitive economy requires:

1. Many buyers and sellers (no market power or monopoly)
2. Perfect information
3. Mobile resources (no barrier to entry and exit)
4. Homogenous goods (anonymity of supplier)



Coase Theorem

When there are externalities, parties will negotiate to an efficient outcome provided that the initial property rights are well-defined, there are zero transaction costs, and there is perfect information.

Moreover, the efficiency of the outcome is independent of the initial allocation of property rights.



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Requirements:

Well-defined property rights

Perfect information

Low-transaction costs



Implications for the Role of Government in CCS

- Defining property rights
- Generating and disseminating information
- Lowering transactions costs



Defining Property Rights

- Pore space ownership
- Delimiting rights of pore space ownership (c.f., Wyoming HB89)
 - Trespass
 - Negative rule of capture
 - “Heaven to hell” rule
- Ownership of CO₂



Generating and Disseminating Information

- Geoscience
 - Subsurface characterization
 - Chemical reactions
- Risk
 - Surface leakage
 - Groundwater quality effects
 - Regional impacts (e.g., seismicity and heaving)
 - Human health
 - Sterilization of resources
- Alternative uses of subsurface resources



Lowering Transactions Costs

- Coordination costs
 - Search for parties
 - Negotiation
- Strategic behavior
 - Asymmetries of information
 - Hold out and gaming



Lowering Transactions Costs: Coordination Costs

- Search for parties
 - Maintaining complete and accessible real property records
 - Establishing “good faith” or due diligence standards
- Negotiation
 - Providing disinterested facilitators
 - Establishing “good faith” negotiation standards
 - Educating parties
 - General negotiation training
 - Case studies
 - Market information



Lowering Transactions Costs: Strategic Behavior

- Asymmetries of information
 - Technical information
 - Disclosure regulations
 - State geological surveys
 - Market information
 - Results of other negotiations
 - Profitability of CCS operators
- Hold out
 - Establishing good faith bargaining standards



CCS is like...

Oil and natural gas extraction, because...

Both involve using subsurface resources (hydrocarbons and pore space)

Efficient use of the resources requires cooperation among land owners

But not exactly, because...

Oil and natural gas involve extraction of an inherently valuable resource as private property

CCS involves injection of CO₂ to protect public welfare



CCS is like...

Enhanced oil recovery, because...

Both can involve injection of CO₂ into pore space

Both require coordination among landowners

But not exactly, because...

EOR is generally embedded in oil lease contracts

The scale of EOR and CCS with respect to the volumes required are different



CCS is like...

Natural gas storage, because...

Both involve injection and storage of a gas that can migrate

Both are for “the public good”

But not exactly, because...

Natural gas storage is generally conducted in existing production fields with existing contracts

CCS fields might be an order of magnitude greater in size than natural gas storage fields

CCS is permanent storage



CCS is like...

Groundwater extraction, because...

Both implicate the use of aquifers and groundwater rights

Both raise issues of private versus public ownership of groundwater

But not exactly, because...

CCS implicates low-value saline aquifers as storage whereas groundwater extraction implicates high-value freshwater uses.

Saline aquifers are much deeper and CCS does not involve extraction.



CCS is like...

Hazardous waste injection, because...

Both involve deep injection of a substance for long-term confinement

Migration of injectate is a concern for both

But not exactly, because...

CO₂ does not meet the definition of hazardous waste

The quantities of CO₂ and potential for migration are much greater



CCS is like...

Fresh water storage, because...

Both involve injection and storage

Both serve a public purpose

But not exactly, because...

Water is a resource occurring naturally in the ground where CO₂ is a human-produced substance that is introduced

Water storage may be temporary where CO₂ injection is intended to be permanent



CCS is like...

Flying an airplane, because

Both involve potential trespass at substantial distances from the surface

Both are technologies developed after property regimes were developed

Both could damage property, but generally do not

But not exactly, because

Flying over is not permanent

Air flight was long established before the suit for trespass was brought



The Use of Analogies

- The analogies suggest tools, strategies and concepts for dealing with the conflict between private property and public welfare.
- The law that pertains to each analogy can not be directly applied to CCS



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Eminent domain (Natural gas storage)

Unitization (EOR)

Servitude (Freshwater storage)

Requirement of actual damages (Hazardous Waste)

Limitation on extent of property (Air flight)




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


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
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


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
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Thank you!



Limited Role for Government?

- Perhaps, if property rights can be defined and transactions costs can be reduced to a manageable level.
- In some cases, particularly with large numbers of parties and complex systems, transactions costs dominate – then government imposition of outcomes may be more efficient (c.f., UIC).

Conclusions

- State governments will need to carefully define their role in the CCS environment
- If the government wants to follow a market-driven approach, then the states' primary responsibilities will be to
 - Clarify property rights
 - Reduce transactions costs
 - Produce information
- There are some cases where the transactions costs are just too high, particularly in issues of broad public safety, when even a market-oriented policy maker will have to allow for state control.